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Blockchain, the underlying technology of Bitcoin, refers to the pub-
lic ledger used in a distributed network. Because blockchain does not
rely on a central authority, peers have to agree on the state of the ledger
among themselves, i.e., they have to reach a consensus on the state of the
transactions. The way nodes reach that consensus has gained incredible
attention in the literature. Bitcoin uses the Proof-of-Work (PoW) mech-
anism, as did Ethereum at first. The latter decided to move from PoW
to Proof-of-Stake (PoS) because of the high energy consumption required
by PoW. To date, many other consensus protocols have been proposed to
address the limitations of the seminal ones.
In this paper, we inform researchers and practitioners about the cur-
rent state of consensus protocols research. The aim is to provide an analy-
sis of the research introducing new consensus protocols in order to enable
a more unified treatment. To that end, we review 28 new consensus pro-
tocols and we propose a four-category classification framework: Origin,
Design, Performance and Security. We demonstrate the applicability of
the framework by classifying the 28 protocols. Many surveys have al-
ready been proposed in the literature and some of them will be discussed
later in the paper. Yet, we believe that this work is relevant and im-
portant for two reasons. Firstly, blockchain being a fast evolving topic,
new consensus protocols emerge regularly and improvements are also put
forward on a regular basis. Hence, this work aims at reflecting the lat-
est state-of-the-art in terms of consensus protocols. Secondly, we aim to
propose a comprehensive classification framework, integrating knowledge
from multiple works in the literature, as well as introducing classification
dimensions that have not been proposed before.
This work demonstrates that multiple consensus have been proposed
in a short period of time, and highlights the differences between these
protocols. Furthermore, it is suggested that researchers and practitioners
who aim to propose consensus protocols in the future should pay attention
to all the dimensions presented in the classification framework.
Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus Protocols, Survey, Proof-of-Work,
Proof-of-Stake, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
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1 Introduction
Blockchains have gained worldwide attention in the world in the last decade,
with the growing popularity of Bitcoin, of which every boom and crash has
been profusely documented. But what is Bitcoin and what is its relation to
blockchain? Bitcoin is a decentralized cryptocurrency. Using the Bitcoin net-
work, peers can transfer any amount of Bitcoins (BTC) in a transaction without
the need for a trusted or central authority. Blockchain is the underlying tech-
nology of Bitcoin, it is the “decentralized transparent (public) ledger with the
transaction records” [1].
Originally, the blockchain technology was solely used for monetary transac-
tions. And even if, at the beginning, Bitcoin was considered as a speculative
investment - and might still be considered as such by some - more and more
organizations allow their customers to pay using Bitcoin. The interested reader
is invited to consult the website coinmap.org, which offers an aggregated view of
businesses accepting Bitcoin as a method of payment. Following the success of
Bitcoin, many other cryptocurrencies have emerged over the years. Those other
cryptocurrencies are called “atlcoins” for “alternative to Bitcoins”. There are
about 5000 altcoins today, the most popular ones are: Tether, Tezos, Litecoin,
Monero, and Maker to name a few.
With time, blockchains progress from a technology enabling exclusively mon-
etary transactions, to a programmable platform. Ethereum was the first blockchain
that allowed the development and deployment of smart contracts and decentral-
ized applications. This new evolution has increased the number of opportunities
- and challenges - for the adoption of blockchain technology.
Whether we are dealing with a blockchain supporting money transfers and/or
the design of decentralized applications, both types work without any central
authority. And because blockchains do not rely on a central authority, a mech-
anism needs to be put in place to ensure trust in the system. This mechanism
is the consensus protocol. It is an algorithm that ensures all the peers agree
on the state of the digital ledger, i.e. on the state of the transactions.
Bitcoin uses the Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus protocol, where nodes com-
pete with each other to create the next block. In order to mine the next block,
nodes participating in the competition need to solve an energy-intensive puzzle.
Because this mechanism is not energy efficient, other consensus protocols have
been proposed in order to mitigate this limitation. Examples of such consen-
sus mechanisms are the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) and the Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT) and will be explained in Section 2.2.
The aim and corresponding contribution of this paper is to propose a survey
of the latest consensus protocols, and a framework that will allow readers
to analyze and compare those protocols alongside various dimensions. Many
surveys have already been proposed in the literature and some of them will be
discussed later in the paper. However, we believe that our work differs from
other surveys as follows:
• Blockchain being a fast evolving topic, new consensus protocols emerge
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regularly and improvements are also put forward on a regular basis. Hence,
this survey aims at reflecting the latest state-of-the-art in terms on con-
sensus protocols.
• Moreover, we want to propose a comprehensive classification framework,
integrating knowledge from multiple works in the literature, as well as
introducing classification dimensions that have not necessarily been pro-
posed before.
This work has multiple practical implications, for both researchers and prac-
titioners. First of all, it will enable readers to understand the fundamentals of
blockchain consensus protocols. Secondly, it will help the community to com-
pare existing protocols and decide on the most appropriate protocol for a specific
blockchain system. Finally, the framework could facilitate the design of future
protocols.
The contributions and practical implications are in line with Gregor’s Nature
of Theory in Information Systems [2]. More specifically, the author presented
five types of theory in Information Systems (IS), each type having distinguishing
attributes. The Type 1 is the Theory for Analyzing and aims to describe “what
is” without the intention to go beyond the analysis and description. Classifica-
tion schema, frameworks or taxonomies are examples of variants of this theory
type, as well as a revision of a previous classification to reflect either the coming
and/or discovery of new entities, or another (and preferred) way of categoriz-
ing. In order to make a contribution to knowledge with this type of theory, little
should be known about the phenomena under study [2]. This work here aims
to propose a useful classification framework, which will aid in the analysis of
consensus protocols. This framework will build on existing surveys to propose
a more comprehensive and integrated taxonomy. Blockchains and by extension
consensus protocols are a fairly new and fast-moving technology. Therefore we
feel it makes sense to approach these phenomena in light of Gregor’s Theory for
Analyzing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The Related Work is
presented in Section 2 and is composed of (i) a general background on blockchain
in Section 2.1, (ii) a detailed explanation of the seminal consensus algorithms
in Section 2.2, and (iii) the existing surveys on consensus protocols, as well as
the newly proposed consensus protocols in Section 2.3. Section 3 introduces the
classification framework and Section 4 analyzes the protocols discussed earlier




In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto proposed Bitcoin, a decentralized cryptocurrency.
Using the Bitcoin network, peers can transfer any amount of Bitcoins (BTC) in
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a transaction without the need for a trusted or central authority. As mentioned
earlier, blockchain is the underlying technology of Bitcoin.
Blockchain is a decentralized public ledger storing the transactions and is
“structured into a linked list of blocks” [3]. In a blockchain, transactions are
stored in a block. More specifically, the block is composed of a block header
and the list of transactions, which are stored in a Merkle tree (for more infor-
mation about this specific data structure, the reader is invited to consult [4,5]).
A blockchain offers multiple benefits, namely decentralization, transparency,
immutability, security and privacy [6].
Over the years, the blockchain technology has evolved to fit various needs,
and three types of blockchains have emerged [3, 7, 8]:
• Public blockchains. Examples include Bitcoin and Ethereum.
• Private blockchains. Private blockchains are used by a single organiza-
tion.
• Consortium blockchains. Industry consortia using specialized private
blockchains. An example is Hyperledger Fabric [9, 10].
These types of blockchains lead to a first way to classify consensus protocols,
namely using the incentivized/non-incentivized dichotomy. Public blockchains
are open to everyone and thus keep the original philosophy of Bitcoin, while the
other two are permissioned schemes. Specifically, in public blockchains, every
node can take part in the consensus process (i.e. the process ensuring that all
nodes have the same version of the valid transaction history); while in consor-
tium and private blockchains, nodes need to get permission. Public blockchains
need to implement an incentive mechanism so that the nodes participating in
the network are encouraged to verify and validate the transactions and the
blocks (the mining process). Indeed, the procedure being time- and energy-
consuming, the nodes typically get a fee for every block mined. On the other
hand, permission-based blockchains do not necessarily need to implement such
complex incentive mechanism. Trusted business relationships are an example of
factors ensuring trust in the system [11].
Even if Bitcoin was the pioneer in making blockchain popular, others have
also gained in popularity over the years. An example is Ethereum [12], which
offers a platform with a built-in Turing-complete programming language which
anyone can use to write Smart Contracts and Decentralized Applications.
2.2 Consensus Protocols
The blockchain system consists, among other elements, of nodes, and does not
rely on a central authority regulating the content of the ledger. The nodes have
to agree on the content themselves. They have to reach a consensus about the
state of the ledger without any single trusted third-party. More specifically, the
nodes have to agree on the blocks to be added to the chain. The consensus was
defined by [13] as:
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“Blockchain technology makes it possible to build an accurate ledger
by relying not on a central authority but on an algorithm involving
many independent people or computers called network nodes. This
algorithm is called a (decentralized) consensus algorithm.”
A consensus will be effective if the following elements are present [14]:
1. The Legal structure (i.e. laws, rules, transitions and states) of the blockchain
is accepted
2. The Agent structure (i.e. nodes, methods and stakeholders applying the
legal structure) of the blockchain is accepted
3. The Equality structure (i.e.members feel that all members are equal under
the consensus laws) is recognized
Various authors highlighted the properties that a consensus protocol should
have. These properties are presented in Table 1.




If all nodes produce the same and valid
(according to the rules of the protocol)
outputs, then the consensus protocol
can be considered safe.
[15], [16] (drawing on
the work of [17])
Liveness If all non-faulty nodes participating in
consensus produce a value, then the
consensus protocol can be considered to
guarantee liveness.
[15]
Validity The set of messages delivered by the
correct nodes includes all the messages
broadcast by the correct nodes.
[16] (drawing on the
work of [17])
Integrity. The set of messages delivered by the
correct nodes includes no false mes-
sages.
[16] (drawing on the
work of [17])
Total order All correct nodes deliver all the mes-
sages in the same order.




If the consensus can recover from the
failure of a node, then the consensus can
be considered to provide fault tolerance.
[15]
Multiple consensus protocols exist. The seminal ones are: (i) Proof-of-
Work (PoW), (ii) Proof-of-Stake (PoS), (iii) Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT). They are briefly described below.
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2.2.1 Proof-of-Work.
Bitcoin [18] and originally Ethereum [12] adopt the PoW protocol. The PoW
mechanism is based on the resolution of a puzzle. Nodes compete with each
other to create the next block. In order to create the next block, a node has
to (i) verify the transactions that will be part of the block and (ii) create the
header. The block header is composed of different elements: (i) the root of the
Merkle tree (recall that the transactions are stored in the form of a Merkle tree
in the core of the block; as for the block header, it will only store the root of that
data structure), (ii) the hash of the previous block (linking the block with the
previous one, and hence creating a chain of blocks), (iii) the restriction regarding
the solution to the puzzle (it is the number of zeros the hash of the header has
to have at the beginning of the string, the higher the number of zero, the more
difficult the puzzle), (iv) the timestamp, and finally (v) the nonce (Figure 1).
The header will be complete once the miner discovers the nonce, i.e. once the
miner solves the puzzle (Figure 2). The resolution is based solely on computer
power and not logic [19,20].
Figure 1: Process of Block Creation
Figure 2: Sub-process of Puzzle Resolution
6
Once a node has finalized the block, it is communicated to the other nodes of
the network. The nodes verify that the block is correctly created and they add
it to the (block)chain, validating its relevance to the transaction history [19].
The main limitations of the PoW consensus are [21]:
• Tight trade-off between performance and security. The PoW is
known for its low transaction throughput (i.e. the transaction throughput
refers to the number of transactions processed by second). In PoW, there
is a fixed rate of block generation and there is also a maximum block
size. More specifically, a block has to be generated on average every 10
minutes. The reason behind this interval is to make sure that the previous
block is sufficiently propagated across the network before the creation of a
new block. Options to improve performance could be to: (i) reduce block
interval, or (ii) increase block size. However, on the one hand, a reduced
block interval would lead to a higher transaction capacity, but also a higher
risk of insufficiently propagated blocks. The latter would undermine the
security of the network by increasing the likelihood of forks incidents. An
increased block size would lead to the same problem. Indeed, a larger block
will lead to higher transmission delays and insufficient propagation [21].
• Energy inefficiency. The PoW is widely criticized for its huge energy
consumption. This is due to the block generation scheme [21].
• Vulnerability to the Eclipse attack. An Eclipse attack is an attack
where a victim does not receive transactions she is interested in, because
an attacker has gained control of a large number of IP addresses and has
surrounded the victim with these specific addresses [22].
• Vulnerability to Selfish mining. A selfish mining attack occurs when
a malicious user or group of users keep all the mined blocks for themselves
and only broadcast them when their own chain becomes longer than the
main chain of blocks. The attacker private chain thereby becomes the
longer - and thus - main chain [23].
• Mining pools and centralization risk. First of all, because of the
design behind PoW, a miner is more likely to collect a significant mining
revenue if she has a significant computing power. Miners who collect a
significant mining revenue can then afford more efficient, more powerful
mining hardware. This positive network effect can lead to a wealth cen-
tralization risk. Moreover, today, it is extremely difficult for a solo miner
to successfully participate in a PoW consensus given that she competes
against mining pools - i.e. groups of miners pooling their computing re-
sources. Moreover, a study has shown that in 2018, eight mining pools
were responsible for the majority of the gross mining power. This also
leads to a wealth centralization risk [21].
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2.2.2 Proof-of-Stake.
The PoS consensus was first introduced by [24] in order to mitigate the high
resource consumption of PoW. Ethereum transitioned from PoW to PoS for
that reason.
In PoS, nodes (called validators instead of miners) deposit a stake, corre-
sponding to an amount of coins they own (Step 1). The idea behind PoS is
that the higher the stake, the higher the chance to actually validate the block
and hence win the competition. The validators generate the block similarly to
Nakamoto’s PoW. In PoS, the validator still needs to compute the hash of the
block’s header and meet a certain target. The difference with the PoW is that
in PoS, nodes compute the hash over a limited search space, whereas in PoW
the hashing operation is done over an unlimited search space [20,24–27].
The scheme used to calculate the probability of a node producing the next
block can differ, i.e. can use different criteria. For example, [28] designed
a framework for the sharing of medical imaging and used the PoS consensus
mechanism. The author used the number of a specific type of transactions
(Design Study) as the driver of the probability.
The main limitations of the PoS consensus are [21]:
• Costless simulation problem. As PoS does not require intensive com-
putation, any node can simulate any segment of blockchain history cost-
lessly; giving attackers the opportunity to fabricate an alternative blockchain.
• Nothing-at-stake problem. A problem where users have nothing to lose
by contributing to multiple concurrent blockchains, and thereby creating
forks in blockchain and not guaranteeing a single blockchain (and thus a
single source of truth) [29]. The idea is that a node on a blockchain will
build on every fork possible. This is true for two reasons: (i) Because
the PoW is not needed anymore, it does not cost the validator anything
to validate transactions on multiple branches of the blockchain; and (ii)
Drawing on game theory, it is in the validators’ interest to build on every
fork.
• Vulnerability to the posterior corruption. The posterior corruption
is triggered by the transparency regarding the staking history, including
stakeholder addresses and staking amounts. An attacker can try to bribe
nodes by promising them rewards for supporting an alternative chain con-
taining forged transactions. The targeted nodes would be the ones who
owned substantial stakes at some point in time but little at the moment.
If the attacker is able to reach a high number of stakeholders, then they,
together, could be able to grow an alternative (and malicious) chain that
would surpass the main chain [21].
• Vulnerability to the long-range attack. A long-range attack occurs
when a group of attackers grow a longer valid chain than the main chain,
starting a few blocks after the genesis block, instead of starting a few
blocks before the current block [21].
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• Vulnerability to the stake-grinding attack. Attackers can take ad-
vantage of the publicly available staking history to distort the randomness
of PoS [21].
• Centralization risk. This risk is similar to the centralization risk re-
ported above for the PoW [21].
A particular case of PoS is Delegated-Proof-of-Stake (DPoS). In a DPoS
consensus, nodes holding stakes vote for block verifiers. In that context, any
node has the right or the chance to create blocks, even if she does not hold much
stake in the network [20,27].
2.2.3 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance.
The PBFT is based on the work of [30]. Informally, a blockchain adopting
the PBFT consensus protocol works as follows. A node - called the client -
sends a proposed block to another node - called the primary. The primary then
multicasts the proposed block to multiple other nodes - called backups. If a
given number of nodes agree on the proposed block, then the block is added to
the chain. Otherwise the block is discarded.
More specifically, once a client sends a request (a proposed block) to a pri-
mary node, a three-phase process actually starts:
1. Pre-Prepare. The primary creates a “pre-prepare” message to send to
the backups. The backups will accept the pre-prepare message if several
conditions regarding the validity of the message are met. Once a backup
accepts the pre-prepare message, it enters in the Prepare phase.
2. Prepare. The backups send a “prepare” message to the other nodes (pri-
mary and backups). The other nodes check the validity of the prepare
message. If the prepare message is verified, then the nodes enter the Com-
mit phase.
3. Commit. The nodes multicast a “commit” message to the other nodes.
The nodes check and accordingly accept the commit message. If the com-
mit message is accepted, the nodes execute the request and send a reply
to the client.
The client waits for f + 1 replies from different nodes with the same result; this
is the result of the operation [20, 25, 27, 30, 31]. This discussion is illustrated in
Figure 3. For the sake of clarity, some message flows were omitted: the message
flows between the primary nodes and the backup nodes, as well as the message
flow between the backup nodes and the client.
The main limitation of the BFT consensus is:
• Limited scalability. BFT offers a good performance for a small number
of replicas [32].
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Multiple surveys of consensus protocols have been carried out. Multiple pa-
pers review and offer a comparison of consensus protocols used in blockchains
systems [16, 20, 25, 33–35]. More specifically, [33] compared different consensus
for permissionless blockchains. [34] proposed a survey of multiple Proof-Based
and Vote-Based consensus. [20] referenced and offered a comparison of PoW,
PoS, DPoS, PBFT and Ripple; the protocols used in most blockchain systems.
The authors compared the protocols based on various dimensions, namely: (i)
fault tolerance, (ii) limitations, (iii) scalability, and (iv) application. [25] exe-
cuted the same exercise with PoW, Chain-based PoS, BFT-style PoS, Proof-of-
Elapsed Time (PoET), PBFT, and Ripple Protocol; and also compared them
alongside various dimensions: (i) permission needed, (ii) third party needed,
(iii) consensus finality, (iv) connectivity requirement, (v) fault tolerance, and
(vi) example. [16] compared a wide range of permissioned blockchain systems
(Hyperledger Fabric, Tendermint, Symbiont, R3 Corda, Iroha, Kadena, Chain,
Quorum, MultiChain, Sawtooth Lake, Ripple, Stellar, and IOTA); while [35]
compared Ripple and Tendermint.
Multiple works proposed a framework to analyze and compare protocols.
Examples include the five-component framework composed of: (i) the block
proposal, (ii) the block validation, (iii) the information propagation, (iv) the
block finalization, and (v) the incentive mechanism [21]; the PREStO framework
[36] which stands for and was built along the following axes: (i) Persistence, (ii)
Robustness, (iii) Efficiency, (iv) Stability, and (v) Optimality; BLOCKBENCH
[26] that allows for a quantitative analysis of consensus protocols; and finally,
the work of [37], an evaluation framework for consensus protocols, highlighting
the capabilities of protocols, such as the safety and performance characteristics.
Several works proposed an overview of the main consensus protocols [38,39].
Another noteworthy work is [40] drawing on [41]. The authors proposed a
comprehensive survey of the blockchain protocols and an analysis of cryptocur-
rencies. Finally, various authors focused their work on a summary of consen-
sus protocols applicable to the Internet of Things (IoT) [42, 43]. Other au-
thors proposed an in-depth analysis of the PoW, PoS and/or the BFT proto-
cols [6,32,44–49]. [50] identified design challenges and opportunities for consen-
sus protocols. Finally, [51] proposed a model for reasoning about properties of
protocols.
Our work here builds on the existing surveys in the literature but differs
on two aspects: (i) we will take into account consensus protocols that were
not systematically analyzed before, and (ii) we will propose a more comprehen-
sive classification framework. We will draw on the properties discussed before
and the dimensions presented in Tables 2 to 5, but we will also propose new
classification dimensions.
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Table 2: Summary of existing surveys - Part 1
Characteristics Authors
Alternative equilibrium concepts [36]
Block finalization [21]
Block generation speed [6, 34]
Block proposal [21]
Block validation [21]






Consensus finality [6, 20,25,32]
Consensus process [6]
Correctness proof [32]
Decentralization (Pools of nodes) [34,36]
Designing goal [33]
DoS resistance [37]
Double spending attack [34]
Energy consumption [6, 20,32,34,36,42,52]
Table 3: Summary of existing surveys - Part 2
Characteristics Authors
Experimental set up [37]
Fairness [36]
Fault-tolerance [6, 16,20,21,25,26,32,36,37,42,52]
Feature of puzzle design [33]
Forking [34]
Governance and sustainability [36]








Table 4: Summary of existing surveys - Part 3
Characteristics Authors
Liveness [36]
Multiple committee - Intra com-
mittee configuration
[37]




Network synchrony assumption [6, 32]
Node identity management [20,25,26,32,42,52]
Origin of hardness [33]
Out-of-protocol incentives [36]
Privacy [36,42]





Simulation of random function [33]
Table 5: Summary of existing surveys - Part 3
Characteristics Authors
Single committee - Committee
configuration
[37]









Transaction confirmation speed [6]
Transaction throughput [6]
Transaction scope [36]
Trusted third party needed [25,42]
Weak and strong persistence [36]
Zero Knowledge Proof properties [33]
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2.3.2 New Protocols
Multiple authors proposed new consensus protocols in order to mitigate the
limitations of the ones discussed in Section 2.2. This section gives a succinct
overview of the new consensus protocols. Section 4 will address them in more
detail in light of the Classification framework.
First of all, several works built on and addressed the limitations of the PoW
protocol. We will cover here the Proof-of-Luck consensus; the FruitChains
blockchain; Register, Deposit, Vote (RDV); a consensus using a Two-Phase
Cooperative Bargaining approach; and a consensus using the Condorcet voting
mechanism. The Proof-of-Luck consensus is based on three existing consensus
mechanisms - namely PoW, Proof-of-Time and Proof-of-Ownership - and offers
multiple benefits such as: ensuring liveness and persistence, providing energy
efficient mining and low-latency transaction validation [53]. FruitChains was
proposed as a fair blockchain in order to ensure that rewards are evenly dis-
tributed among the miners of the blocks [54]. Then, RDV [55] is a solution
appropriate for the IoT because of the absence of mining process. A consensus
using a Two-Phase Cooperative Bargaining approach was proposed to address
the problem of high computational costs of PoW. The proposed model is based
on the idea “to split the transactions between multiple shards while processing
them in parallel” [56]. Finally, [57, 58] proposed to address the limitations of
PoW by using the Condorcet voting mechanism to determine the miner. The
authors focused on public blockchains and on specific applications, namely the
registration of Internet auction, of sports bets or of energy exchange.
Also, various authors built on, and proposed solutions to mitigate the lim-
itations of PoS. We will cover here the following protocols: Robust Round
Robin, the Fantômette, the CloudPoS, the Trust Consensus Protocol (Trust-
CP), Delegated Proof-of-Stake with Downgrade mechanism (DDPoS), the use
of weighted voting in the PoS protocol, and the Proof-of-Supply-Chain-Share
(PoSCS). The Robust Round Robin consensus protocol was designed for per-
missionless blockchains, and was conceived to address the limitation of PoS of
leader selection [59]. The Fantômette protocol encompasses Caucus, a secure
leader election protocol, and provides game-theoretic guarantees as well as tra-
ditional security properties [60]. In CloudPoS [61], the authors addressed the
use of blockchain to the management of data provenance in cloud. They used
PoS, where the users stake the cloud computing resources in order to become
validators. On the other hand, the Trust-CP calculates a trust score for a peer,
which is then sent to the network via a blockchain transaction. The latter is
added to a block and the block is validated through a PoS consensus. The
goal is a blockchain-based solution to ensure trust between peers [62]. Weighted
voting was also used in the PoS protocol to keep the selection and reward alloca-
tion scheme, while protecting against the effects of validators who abstain from
voting [63]. Next, DDPos [64] builds on both PoW and DPoS. The authors
carried out simulation experiments and concluded that the solution performs
well in terms of several criteria. Indeed, the solution: (i) is more efficient than
PoW and PoS, however not more efficient than DPoS, (ii) offers less decen-
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tralization than DPoS, and (iii) ensures the security of the system. Finally,
a blockchain-IoT-based food traceability system (BIFTS) [65] uses the PoSCS
consensus protocol, which is similar to PoS. The motivation behind the novel
consensus was the fact that the existing ones were not appropriate for supply
chain management because they are too specific to cryptocurrency.
Other works built on the BFT protocol. We will cover here the follow-
ing protocols: an implicit consensus, FastBFT, Yet Another Consensus (YAC),
Tendermint, Block-Supply, and Proof-of-Learning. An implicit consensus was
proposed by [66] to mitigate the throughput limitations known in Bitcoin for
example. The authors proposed a permissioned blockchain-based solution con-
sisting of four layers: (i) transactions, (ii) individual blockchains, (iii) consensus
scheme, and (iv) validation scheme. The novelty in their approach was mainly
based on two elements: (i) the nodes stored only the transactions in which they
are directly involved, and (ii) they distinguished between two types of blocks,
namely the Transaction Blocks and the Check Point Blocks. Only the latter are
broadcast to the other nodes in order to reach consensus. FastBFT [67] built
on the BFT protocol and used a novel message aggregation technique, making
the BFT protocol faster and more scalable. YAC [68] intended to solve prob-
lems occurring in the BFT protocols, namely inefficient message passing and
strong leaders. Another important consensus is Tendermint [69], a novel termi-
nation algorithm that benefits from the gossip based nature of communication.
Block-Supply [70, 71] is a blockchain system tackling counterfeit goods. The
corresponding consensus protocol uses, for each new block, a set of randomly
chosen validators. Each time, both the set of validators and the size of the set
are different. Finally, Proof-of-Learning [72] is a protocol used in a blockchain
serving as an open repository of machine learning models and datasets.
Other authors drew on multiple classic consensus protocols to propose hy-
brid protocols or address the limitations of less known consensus algorithms.
Specifically, we will cover here the following protocols: Solida, Hybrid Consen-
sus, Panda, Improved Scalable Consensus Protocol (ISCP). First, Solida [73,74]
is based on PoW and Byzantine consensus and its aim was to address two
limitations of the Bitcoin protocol, namely limited throughput and long confir-
mation time of transactions. Then, drawing from Scalable Consensus Protocol
(SCP) [75], which originally was an hybrid of PoW and BFT, the authors pro-
posed a two-step consensus mechanism: (i) an intra-committee consensus, and
(ii) an inter-committee consensus. A committee is composed of randomly as-
signed nodes. The intra-committee validates separate sets of transactions and
creates sub-blocks. The inter-committee generates the final block by including
all sub-blocks. Both committees use BFT. Panda [76] is a consensus designed
for permissionless blockchains. The implementation of this solution showed that
the consensus performed better than PoW or BFT in terms of time to reach
consensus, desired throughput and scalability. Finally, ISCP [77] was designed
as an improved version of the SCP consensus protocol.
We will finish this section with the following consensus protocols: Proof-
of-Vote, Lightweight consensus protocol, Proof-of-Disease, Proof-of-Play (PoP),
and finally a consensus protocol module for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).
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Proof-of-Vote [78] was designed for consortium blockchains. Participants in the
blockchain are assigned one of four roles or identities, based on the idea of a
voting campaign and voting mechanism. A lightweight consensus protocol ap-
propriate for private blockchains was proposed in [79]. It is lightweight because
the consensus does not rely on extensive calculations, nor an elaborate voting
scheme, nor a large amount of cryptocurrency to participate in the system. In-
stead, the protocol relies on an announcement system, where a miner announces
its intention to mine a block in the future. Proof-of-Disease [80] is a consen-
sus applicable in a blockchain for medical decisions. Based on data about a
patient’s health, medical experts make a decision about a particular disease or
the overall health state of that patient. PoP [81] is a consensus protocol for
a blockchain-based gaming system. The authors argue that PoW, because of
its limitations (high transaction costs and latency), is not appropriate for the
gaming application. Moreover, the authors claimed that the other attempts
of consensus were not appropriate either because they modify the game itself.
Finally, a consensus protocol module for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
based on a reputation scheme was proposed in [82]. The idea was that their
module can be implemented on top of existing consensus protocols such as PoW
or PoS.
3 Classification Framework
This section introduces the classification framework that will be used to analyze
and compare consensus protocols. The framework is composed of both dimen-
sions that were already proposed by existing works, as well as new dimensions.
The aim is to provide a framework that is as comprehensive as possible.
The framework is composed of four categories, which are further composed
of several dimensions. The overview of the framework is proposed in Table 6
and the categories are thoroughly explained below. The Table shows that 14
out of the 23 dimensions come from an integration of the existing surveys, and
the other 9 dimensions are new in this framework. For the dimensions Candi-
dates formation, Candidates configuration, Committee formation and Commit-
tee configuration, a superscript is added in the Table. In the existing surveys,
authors used the dimension Committee Formation or Committee configuration,
as reported in Tables 2 to 5. In this classification framework, we separated the
aspect of candidates and committee. Hence, the dimensions Candidates forma-
tion and Candidates configuration are accompanied by a − because they are
new in the sense that the other surveys did not explicitly mention them (3),
however they were usually encompassed in Committee formation and Commit-
tee configuration (−). On the other hand, the dimensions Committee formation
and Committee configuration here are accompanied by the symbols + because
they are not new to our classification framework (7) but what they encompass
is usually different from what we can find in other surveys (+).
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The Origin category allows us to answer the following questions: where does
the protocol come from? and why was it proposed?
1. Existing Proof-of-X (PoX): On which seminal consensus protocol is
the new consensus protocol based? The possible values are: PoW, PoS,
and (P)BFT.
2. Existing Theory: On which existing theory(ies) - other than a consensus
protocol - is the new consensus protocol based? Usually works will draw
on existing and validated concepts to build the new algorithm.
3. Answer to known limitation(s): what known limitation(s) does the
new consensus attempt to solve? Indeed, if a new solution is proposed, it
is usually because the existing protocols suffer from limitations that were
not acceptable for the given purpose. What are those limitations?
4. Accessibility: Does the protocol work with a permissioned or permis-
sionless setting?
5. Application: For what type of applications is the consensus protocol
designed? It could be a general purpose, or a specific domain (e.g. for
IoT).
3.2 Design
The Design category allows us to answer the following question: how is the
new protocol developed?
1. Third party needed: Does the protocol rely on a trusted third party
for a common service (typically, for access management)? Normally, a
blockchain solution should be fully decentralized. However, in particular
settings, a third-party might be needed.
2. Incentive: what are the incentives given to the nodes/miners to partic-
ipate in the protocol? As explained earlier, a consensus protocol used in
a public blockchain should have an incentive mechanism in place. This
dimension documents that incentive.
3. Consensus finality: Vukolic̀ defined consensus finality as
“If a correct node p appends block b to its copy of the blockchain
before appending block b′, then no correct node q appends block
b′ before b to its copy of the blockchain.”
The consensus finality has two possible values: probabilistic and de-
terministic (or absolute). Probabilistic finality means that “all written
blocks (except the genesis block) are prone to revocation, although with
small probabilities” [25], while “Deterministic means all written blocks
will never be revoked” [25].
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4. Candidates Formation: Bano et al. [37] explained that we can observe
a shift from a single node towards a group of nodes (called committee)
driving the consensus. This shift is explained by two shortcomings of the
single node consensus: (i) poor performance, and (ii) safety limitations.
The authors in [37] proposed to analyze consensus protocols using the
criteria used to allow nodes to join a committee. The classification
framework proposed here further distinguishes this notion of committee.
The dimension Candidates formation addresses the way potential block
miners are selected and how they thus become “Candidate block miners”.
The possible values are: (i) Free access, (ii) Lottery, (iii) Permission, (iv)
PoW, (v) Score, (vi) Self-interest, (vii) Stake, (viii) Vote.
5. Candidates Configuration: Bano et al. [37] also proposed to use the
way the committee was configured as a dimension. In this framework,
we look at how the block miner candidates are configured, i.e. how does
the pool of candidates develop after a block has been added to the chain.
The possible values are: (i) Static, (ii) Dynamic, (iii) Rolling (single), (iv)
Rolling (multiple), and (v) Full swap. The values (iii) to (v) are special
cases of Dynamic.
6. Leader Selection: If candidate block miners are grouped in a set, a
candidate has to be selected eventually to mine the next block. This
chosen miner is called here a leader. The dimension Leader selection looks
at the way the next miner is effectively chosen. The idea is that, unless the
next miner is chosen completely randomly, an element in the consensus
setting will increase (or decrease) the likelihood of a node to be selected
to mine the next block. The possible values are: (i) Lottery, (ii) None,
(iii) PoW, (iv) Rank, (v) Stake, (vi) Vote.
7. Committee Formation: Following [37], the dimension Committee For-
mation examines how the nodes validating the block are selected. The
candidate block miners are selected, the leader is identified, and the block
is created. Now, other nodes have to validate or invalidate the block newly
created. Here, we look at how those nodes are selected. The possible val-
ues are: (i) Free access, (ii) Lottery, (iii) Permission, (iv) PoW, (v) Score,
(vi) Self-interest, (vii) Stake, (viii) Vote.
8. Committee Configuration: Following [37], the dimension Committee
Configuration examines how the set of validating nodes is configured. The
possible values are: (i) Static, (ii) Dynamic, (iii) Rolling (single), (iv)
Rolling (multiple), and (v) Full swap. The values (iii) to (v) are special
cases of Dynamic.
9. Formal development: does(do) the author(s) provide a formal devel-
opment for her (their) proposal? This formal development can be in the
forms of an algorithm and/or a proof.
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3.3 Performance
The Performance category allows us to answer the following question: how
well does the new consensus protocol perform?
1. Throughput: What is the number of successful transactions per second
starting from the first transaction deployment time [83]?
2. Latency: For each transaction, what is the difference between the com-
pletion time and the deployment time (t2 − t1) [83]?
3. Fault Tolerance: The speed and efficiency of network operations in such
a way that network operations are not dependent on the non-failure of
any specific node or server [14]. If the consensus can recover from the
failure of a node, then the consensus can be considered to provide fault
tolerance [15].
4. Scalability: To what extent does the protocol accommodate an increas-
ing number of nodes and/or process growing volumes of transactions and
blocks [84]?
5. Experimental evaluation: does(do) the author(s) provide an experi-
mental evaluation of her (their) proposal?
3.4 Security
The Security category allows us to answer the following question: Does the
protocol address the protection against the following common attacks, and if it
does, how efficient is it?
1. Sybil attack: “An entity attempting to influence the P2P network by
way of creating multiple identities and controlling” multiple nodes [27].
2. DoS attack: “A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is intended to prevent
users from accessing a service” [27].
3. Double Spending attack or 51 Percent attack: “A malicious node
gains control of more than 50 percent of a blockchain network’s hash rate
and is able to alter and manipulate blocks” [27].
4. Eclipse Attack on the P2P Network: “The attackers gain control
over a peer’s access to information in the P2P network by manipulating
the network so that nodes communicate only with malicious nodes. The
attacker can then manipulate the mining and the consensus mechanism”
[27].
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4 Application of the Framework
Tables 7 to 14 summarize the comparisons of protocols. In the Tables, the
symbol 7 indicates that the authors did not mention the aspect in their work.
Also, in Table 14, the symbol 3 is used to indicate that the consensus protects
the blockchain against a specific attack, while the symbol 77 indicates that it
does not.
4.1 Application of the Origin Category
For the Origin category, we can see from Tables 7 to 9 that all three seminal
algorithms were used as the basis for the development of almost all new pro-
tocols. Exceptions include Proof-of-Reputation-X (PoRX) [82], which can be
implemented on top of various consensus protocols, such as PoW and PoS; and
Fantômette [60] which is compatible with PoS, but could also be used for other
PoX. The authors do not draw on a particular protocol. Next, about half of
the new solutions drew on another existing theory (ranging from Fuzzy logic
to Condorcet voting mechanism), while the other half did not. Almost all of
the new algorithms aimed to address the limitations of the common consen-
sus, namely: resource consumption (energy and/or time), limited throughput,
high latency, security, to name a few. The Permissionless and Permissioned
settings are well distributed; and finally, the new solutions were proposed both
for general purpose and for specific applications, such as IoT.
4.2 Application of the Design Category
For the Design category, the discussion is summarized in Tables 10 to 12. For all
consensus designed for permissioned blockchains, there need to be a permission
management module. Hence, for [28, 29, 61, 65–71, 78–80, 82], a third party will
be documented. In Robust Round Robin [59], identity creation can be handled
in two different ways: (i) Bootstrap from Existing Infrastructures, (ii) Mining
identities. In Table 10 , we document thus (i) and we also indicate there is
also the possibility to manage the creation without any third party (77). Other
consensus that rely on a third party are [65,72].
As far as the incentive mechanism is concerned, some consensus mechanisms
explicitly state that a fee or reward will be given to the selected miner. It is
the case for [28, 29, 54, 56–61, 63, 69–74, 76, 78, 80, 82]. Some consensus rely on
the self-interest of the nodes [66]. Another type of incentive is a concept that
influences the selection of the miner, such as the level of reputation or trust.
Examples of such consensus are [55,62,82]. Others plan a punishment if a node
behaves maliciously [55, 60, 62, 64, 70, 71, 76, 77, 82]. Finally, some works do not
mention explicitly the incentive mechanism in place [53,65,67,68,75,79,81].
Usually, the consensus finality was not explicitly expressed by the authors.
However, following the definitions provided in Section 3, we can state that [29,

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In [28], the author introduced a consensus for medical image sharing, and
used a PoS scheme where the stake is driven by the number of Define trans-
actions initiated by a node (Candidates formation is Permission and Leader
Selection is based on Stake). For each block, the candidates pool will stay
the same, but the stakes will change (Candidates configuration is Static). The
author does not explicitly explain how the blocks are then validated.
The Fruitchains [54] is similar to the classical PoW, but in Fruitchains,
the transactions are stored in fruits, fruits in turn are stored in blocks. The
miner still has to solve a PoW (Candidates formation is Free access and Leader
selection is PoW ) and the other nodes have to validate the block proposed
by the miner (Committee formation is Free access). Fruitchains works with
permissionless blockchains, nodes can join or leave the blockchain whenever
they want (Candidates and Committee configurations are Dynamic).
In Proof-of-Luck [53], all participants are required to use a Trusted Execu-
tion Environments (TEE), and the trusted platform vendor controls the cor-
rect execution of the algorithm inside each participant’s TEE. Participants can
prepare a block (Candidates formation is Permission by the trusted platform
vendor), and the winning block will be determined randomly (Leader selection
is Lottery). The winning block will be broadcast to other participants for vali-
dation. Each round, all nodes can be candidates and be part of the committee.
Hence, the Candidates and the Committee configurations are Static, while the
Committee formation is Permission.
In [56], shards are formed randomly for each epoch. In each shard, nodes
create subblocks and send it to the so-called adjusting shard. The latter will
combine and validate all the subblocks running a standard byzantine protocol,
and finally this adjusting shard will broadcast the final to the rest of the network
(Candidates and Committee formations are Lottery, Leader selection is Lottery).
When another epoch starts, the whole process starts again too (Candidates and
Committee configurations are Dynamic).
In [57,58], nodes need to place their service offer in the form of voting tokens
to the previous miner (Candidates formation is Stake). The future miner will
be selected based on a score using four criteria: voting token, age of the last
block, reputation, and random (Leader selection is Rank). For the next block,
the process starts again (Candidates configuration is Dynamic). The authors
do not explicitly explain how the blocks are then validated.
In Robust Round Robin [59], each identity is assigned an age, i.e. an integer
referring to the number of rounds since its enrollment or last block creation. A
small set of oldest identities are chosen, the Candidates formation can thus be
considered Score-based, and the Candidates configuration Rolling single. Then
a set of endorsers is selected among the recently active identities (Committee
formation is Lottery) in order to choose the node that will actually append its
block to the chain. The miner who receives q confirmations from the endorsers
will be selected as leader (Leader selection is based on Votes). Since the en-
dorsers will change with each new round, we can consider that the Committee
configuration is Dynamic.
In Fantômette [60], candidates need to place a security deposit in order to
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be considered as potential leaders (Candidate formation is Stake) and then as
voters (Committee formation is Stake). The leader is then selected randomly
using a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) and broadcast (Leader selection is
Lottery). The authors usually made the assumption of a dynamic committee
where participants can leave and join the set of participants (Candidates and
Committee configuration are Dynamic).
In CloudPoS [61], the consensus is executed in an epoch. In each epoch,
validators need to stake resources in order to be electable as leader (Candidates
formation is Stake). The leader is selected stochastically based on the individual
stakes (Leader selection is Lottery). The block created by the leader is then
broadcast to the other validators who will either validate and add the block to
the chain, or reject the block (Committee formation is Stake). The whole process
starts again with a new epoch (Candidates and Committee configurations are
Dynamic).
In Trust-CP [62], a five-step process is in place. First, an algorithm selects
a set of nodes having a trust score higher than a given threshold (Candidates
Formation is Score-based). Then, the block miner is randomly selected from that
set of nodes (Leader Selection is Lottery). All other nodes (are incentivized to)
participate in the validation of the block (Committee formation is Free access).
The trust score of the miner will be adapted according to the decision of the
validating committee. Since the trust score is used to filter out peers and create
the set of candidate block miners, we can consider that Candidates configuration
is Dynamic. For the next round of block creation, another node will be selected
as block creator while the validating committee will stay the same except for one
node entering and one node leaving (Committee configuration is Rolling single).
In [63], a node deposits a stake to take part in the mining process (Candidates
formation is Stake) and the miner will be chosen “proportionally to their stake
by a pseudo-random mechanism” (Leader selection is Lottery). This pseudo-
random mechanism also selects a set of validators who will then validate the
proposed block (Committee formation is Stake + Lottery). The whole process
starts again when a new block has to be created. We can thus consider that the
Candidates and Committee configurations are both Dynamic.
In [64], the nodes generating and validating the blocks are selected based on
a two-step process: (i) PoW to select a first set of at least 201 nodes, and (ii)
stake voting to select 201 nodes. From the set of 201 nodes, the top 101 - called
witness nodes - will be the nodes actually generating the blocks (Candidate for-
mation is PoW and Stake voting). The witness nodes take turns to generate a
block (Candidates configuration is Rolling single and Leader selection is Rank)
however, it should be noted that the witness nodes list is updated daily (Can-
didates configuration could be considered Dynamic). Once the block is created,
the witness node broadcasts it to the other (201−1) nodes from step two of the
process (Committee formation is PoW and Stake voting). If the witness node
gets more votes validating the block than votes invalidating the block, then the
block is added to the chain. Finally, the committee members are selected based
on PoW, the Committee configuration is Dynamic.
In [65], the creator of the block is selected based on its stake in the supply
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chain, evaluated by considering various factors, such as the shipment transit
time, the stakeholder assessment and the shipment volume, and a roulette wheel
selection (Candidate formation is Permission and Leader Selection is based on
Stake). The stake is calculated and a miner is selected every time a new block
has to be created (Candidates configuration is Dynamic). The authors do not
explicitly explain how the blocks are then validated.
In [66], the Transaction Blocks are created by the node having an interest
in the transactions composing the block (Candidates formation is Self-interest,
Leader selection is Self-interest, and the Candidates configuration is Static).
The consensus is reached on the Check Points, using a BFT algorithm. However,
the authors do not mention explicitly how the validation committee is formed
nor configured.
Liu et al. [67] build on BFT to propose FastBFT. Following BFT, the Can-
didates formation is considered to be Permissioned, the Leader selection - here
the client - Rank, and the Committee formation is considered to be based on
Permission. We can consider that the Committee configuration is a Full swap
since the primary replica has to choose f +1 new active replicas; and the Candi-
dates configuration is Static for a given set of nodes (although, the set of nodes
allowed to join the network can evolve over time).
In [68], the authors present a consensus, YAC, used in Hyperledger, a per-
missioned blockchain. In YAC, the ordering service (OS) is responsible for the
collection of transactions and the creation of a block proposal. This OS is a set of
nodes, forming an abstract entity which is defined upon network creation [10,68]
(Candidates formation is Permission and Candidates configuration is Static for
a given set of nodes). There is no real leader selection, since the block is created
collectively by the OS (Leader selection is None). The peers then validate the
block proposal (Committee formation is Permission and Committee configura-
tion is Static for a given set of nodes).
In Tendermint [29, 69], nodes willing to participate in the consensus have
to deposit an amount of bonded coins; and in doing so, the nodes become
validators. This amount corresponds to their voting power (Candidates and
Committee formations are based on Stake). In each round, a block proposer is
selected in weighted round-robin fashion such that a validator with more voting
power is selected more frequently as proposer (Leader selection is Rank). The
validators then validate or not the block created by the proposer. The valida-
tors are allowed to unlock their coins at any time (Candidates and Committee
formations are Dynamic).
In Block-Supply chain [70, 71], the next block is proposed by the node that
currently has the product (Candidates formation is Self-interest, Candidates
configuration is Dynamic, and Leader selection is Self-interest). Each block pro-
poser is mapped with four validation-leader nodes who randomly select nodes for
the validation of the block (Committee formation is Lottery). Those validators
change with every new block (Committee configuration is Full Swap).
In Proof-of-Learning [72], nodes are randomly selected to become validators.
A node is more likely to become a validator the more data it stores (Candidates
formation is Lottery). All validators then create a block and broadcast it to
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the other validators. If all validators agree on the block it is added to the
blockchain (Committee formation is Lottery). There is not one single leader,
since all validators create the block simultaneously (Leader Selection is None).
The fee will thus be evenly distributed between all validators. The whole process
starts again when a new task has to be handled (Candidates and Committee
configurations are Dynamic).
Solida [73,74] is a hybrid protocol, combining PoW and PBFT. Nodes try to
solve a PoW, the first one to bring the solution to the puzzle will be selected as
miner (Candidates formation is PoW and Leader selection is Rank). The PoW
is also used for joining the validating committee (Committee formation is PoW ).
Both Candidates and Committee configurations take the value Rolling Single:
a node submitting a PoW to the validating committee leads to a committee
reconfiguration, i.e. a node will leave the committee while another (the node
submitting the PoW) will join it.
In [75], the authors propose a hybrid consensus which runs a PoW consen-
sus to (re-)elect committee members (Committee formation is PoW ), where
the latter consist of recently online miners (Candidates formation is PoW and
Leader selection is PoW ). This process will be executed daily, which makes
the Committee configuration a Full swap, while the Candidates configuration is
Dynamic. Indeed, the authors propose a consensus for a permissionless setting.
The candidates configuration is thus driven by the activity of the miners.
In Panda [76], a block is composed of only one transaction and is created by
the initiator of that transaction (Candidates formation is Self-interest, Leader
selection is Self-interest and Candidates configuration is Dynamic). A voting
committee is only created when a fork is identified. In order to participate in
the resolving of the fork, a node calculates its “consensus identity(ies)” based
on its voting power (Committee formation is Score-based). The process starts
over every time a new fork is observed (Committee configuration is Dynamic).
In [77], the operation is split into epochs. In each epoch, nodes are divided
into multiple sub-committees based on a PoW. The block is then generated in
a two-step process: (i) each sub-committee generates a sub-block and broad-
casts it to the other sub-committees, (ii) each sub-committee agrees on the final
block composed of all the accepted sub-blocks. Because the nodes are split into
sub-committees using a PoW, both Candidates and Committee formation are
PoW. The two-step process starts again with a new epoch (both Candidates
and Committee configurations are Dynamic). Since the final block is generated
using all accepted sub-blocks from the sub-committees, there is not one single
leader (Leader selection is None).
In Proof-of-Vote [78], butlers are the nodes creating the blocks and the com-
missioners are the nodes validating the blocks. To become a butler, a node needs
to register an account, submit a recommendation letter, submit a deposit, and
win an election (Candidates formation is Vote). Once a node becomes a but-
ler, it will be chosen randomly to produce a series of blocks (Leader selection
is Lottery). Once the current butler has created the next block, the block has
to be validated by the commissioners. The butler will create multiple blocks
during a given period of time before switching to the next butler (Candidates
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configuration is Rolling single). Proof-of-Vote is meant to be used by consor-
tium blockchains. In that context, a commissioner is one of the members of the
consortium (Committee formation is Permission, and Committee configuration
is Static).
In Lightweight [79], miners have to pre-announce their desire to mine blocks
(Candidates formation is Message). This message must contain, among other
elements, the miner identification number (MIN) which is the hash value of
its public key concatenated with its unique address identifier. The miner who
will mine the next block is the miner with a MIN closer to the hash value of
the preceding block, or some other similar values (Leader selection is Lottery).
Nodes can submit their mining application whenever they want (Candidates
configuration is Dynamic). The author does not explicitly explain how the
block is then validated.
In [55], if a node wants to vote and actively participate in the network,
it needs to register by depositing a part of its coins (Candidates formation is
Stake). The Candidates configuration can be considered Dynamic since the
evolution of the committee is driven by the desire of nodes to leave registration
mode. In RDV, the distinction between block creation and block validation is
not really present, since the voters first vote on the transactions and they then
all create the block (Leader selection is None). Hence, the same values apply
for Committee formation and Committee configuration as for the Candidates
formation and configuration.
In Proof-of-Disease [80], medical experts have to validate results from a
diagnostic and add the information in the blockchain (Candidates formation
is Permission and Candidates configuration is Static). The authors do not
explicitly explain how the actual miner is selected nor how blocks are then
validated.
In Proof-of-Play [81], if a node wants to create the next block, it must have
paid enough effort in the game (Candidates formation is PoW and Candidates
configuration is Dynamic). The leader is selected randomly (Leader selection
is Lottery). The authors do not explicitly explain how the blocks are then
validated.
PoRX [82] is a module that works on top of other consensus. Thus, the
candidates and committee will be formed and configured according to the initial
consensus (Candidates and Committee Formation and Configuration are not
documented). However, the module is used to exploit the reputation of the
nodes to enhance its likelihood to be selected as the next block miner (Leader
selection is Rank).
Finally, the framework reports the presence or absence of a formal devel-
opment in the work presenting the new consensus. This formal development
can take the form of algorithms and/or proofs confirming the validity of the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 Application of the Performance Category
The third category of the framework is the Performance category (Table 13).
Most of the works considered here proposed an experimental evaluation (Exp in
Table 13) of their solution, which facilitates the analysis of the various dimen-
sions: throughput, latency, fault tolerance and scalability (respectively TP, L,
FT and S in the header of Table 13).
The figures for the Robust Round Robin [59] protocol are reported for a
block of size 2MB and transaction size of 250 bytes (similar to Bitcoin). The
authors evaluated the evolution of the performance over a growing network site
as well as a growing committee size. CloudPoS [61] provides a block latency of 5
to 10 milliseconds with 15 validators. The authors evaluated the evolution of the
performance over a growing network site. To avoid any malicious behaviour, the
consensus makes sure that every validator is recorded. With its default network
size (103 replicas), FastBFT [67] achieves a throughput of about 500 operations
per second, and a latency of 4 ms to answer a request with 1 KB payload. The
authors evaluated the performance with a growing number of replicas. FastBFT
requires 2f + 1 replicas to tolerate f (Byzantine) faults. Block-Supply [70, 71]
offers a latency of 16ms for committing one block, for a network size of 100 nodes.
The authors evaluated the evolution of the performance over a growing network
site. The consensus tolerates up to 1/3 of Byzantine nodes. In [73, 74], the
authors documented the time necessary for a reconfiguration decision regarding
the committee, but they do not inform on the throughput nor latency of the
transactions or the blocks, nor discuss the scalability issue in depth. Solida is
fully Byzantine fault tolerant, i.e. it can tolerate up to 1/3 (33.33%) of faulty
nodes. In Panda [76], the throughput is close to 1200 TPS with a network size
of 100, while the latency of transaction is instantaneous (0s in the Table). The
authors evaluated the evolution of the performance over a growing network site.
In the PoRX solution, mining competition mode can maintain 50% fault-tolerant
rate [82].
Several authors provide an analysis of their consensus, nevertheless, without
any experimental evaluation, we cannot report any figure in the Table. This is
the case for the following works [29,53,55,59,66,69,75,78]. It can be stated that
the implicit consensus [66] is more scalable than the ones on which it is based,
because it reduces the message complexity to O(N). RDV [55] also provides
low latency because it is based on a voting approach (deterministic) instead of
a lottery (probabilistic) approach.
Other authors carry out a simulation but tested other elements than the per-
formance dimensions [56–58,60,63–65,77,81]. For instance, in [60], the authors
focused on the game-theoretic aspects in the experiments. In [56], the author
makes use of sharding, which allows for a better throughput and a better scal-
ability. In [68], the authors try to find the optimal value of a given parameter,
namely the vote step delay, for different network configurations. The authors
also proved that YAC will function as long as there are not more than f faulty
validating peers out of at least 3f + 1 peers on the network.
Finally, the works in [28, 54, 72, 79, 80] do not address any performance di-
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mension nor provide a rationale for them.
Table 13: Application of Classification Framework - Performance.
Consensus TP L FT S Exp
Medical image sharing [28] 7 7 7 7 7
Fruitchains [54] 7 7 7 7 7
Proof-of-Luck [53] 3 3 7 3 7
Cooperative Bargaining [56] 3 7 7 3 3
Condorcet [57,58] 7 7 3 7 7
Robust Round Robin [59] 1500 1min 7 3 3
Fantômette [60] 7 7 7 7 3
CloudPoS [61] 7 10-15ms 3 7 3
Trust-CP [62] 7 7 84% 7 3
Weighted Voting [63] 7 7 7 7 3
DDPoS [64] 7 7 3 7 3
BIFTS [65] 7 7 7 3 3
Implicit [66] 3 77 7 3 7
FastBFT [67] 500 4ms <50% 3 3
YAC [68] 3 3 33% 7 3
Tendermint [29,69] 7 7 33% 7 7
Block-Supply [70,71] 7 16ms 33% 3 3
Proof-of-Learning [72] 7 7 7 7 7
Solida [73,74] 7 7 33% 7 3
Hybrid [75] 3 7 33% 3 7
Panda [76] 1200 0s 7 7 3
ISCP [77] 3 7 33% 7 3
Proof-of-Vote [78] 3 3 <50% 7 7
Lightweight [79] 7 7 7 7 7
RDV [55] 3 3 7 7 7
Proof-of-Disease [80] 7 7 7 7 7
Proof-of-Play [81] 7 7 7 7 3
PoRX [82] 7 7 50% 7 3
4.4 Application of the Security Category
Finally, let’s have a look at the Security category. None of the protocols
considered here address all four attacks, and some of them do not address any
attack at all, to focus on other aspects of the consensus [67,68,79]. Other works
address an attack, but do not provide any proof that their solution is protected
against such attack ( [53] and [63] for the Sybil and Eclipse attacks). The
new solutions are mostly protected against the Sybil and the double spending
attacks; then the DoS attack. Only one protocol explicitly states that it is
protected against the Eclipse attack.
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Table 14: Application of Classification Framework - Security
Consensus Sybil DoS 51% Eclipse
Medical image sharing [28] 7 7 7 7
Fruitchains [54] 3 7 7 7
Proof-of-Luck [53] 7 7 7 7
Cooperative Bargaining [56] 7 7 7 7
Condorcet [57,58] 3 7 7 7
Robust Round Robin [59] 7 77 3 7
Fantômette [60] 3 3 7 7
CloudPoS [61] 7 7 3 7
Trust-CP [62] 3 7 7 7
Weighted Voting [63] 7 7 7 7
DDPoS [64] 7 7 7 7
BIFTS [65] 7 7 3 7
Implicit [66] 7 7 3 7
FastBFT [67] 7 7 7 7
YAC [68] 7 7 7 7
Tendermint [29,69] 7 7 3 7
Block-Supply [70,71] 7 3 7 3
Proof-of-Learning [72] 7 3 7 7
Solida [73,74] 3 7 7 7
Hybrid consensus [75] 3 7 7 7
Panda [76] 3 3 3 7
ISCP [77] 7 7 7 7
Proof-of-Vote [78] 7 7 7 7
Lightweight [79] 7 7 7 7
RDV [55] 7 7 3 7
Proof-of-Disease [80] 7 7 7 7
Proof-of-Play [81] 3 7 3 7
PoRX [82] 3 7 3 7
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5 Discussion
In this Section, we will discuss the results of Section 4 by highlighting some
trends/patterns observed following the application of the framework. We also
discuss the practical implications as well as the limitations of this research.
5.1 Results Analysis
From the applications of the Origin and the Design categories, we can observe
that the authors who raised the problems of high energy/resource consumption
and lack of efficiency of current protocols, proposed to use the Stakes [29, 55,
60, 63, 69], Permission [53], or the Lottery [56, 72] for both Candidates and
Committee formations, a Score either for the Candidates formation [62] or
for the Committee formation [76], or finally a Vote and Permission for the
Candidates formation and Committee formation respectively [78]. In all these
works, the leader is selected either by Lottery or Rank. These configurations
make sense if the authors want to mitigate the energy consumption caused by
PoW.
Other authors focused on the efficiency problem, including the throughput
and latency of existing protocols. Their solutions are based on the use of PoW
[73–75,77], Permission [53,68],and Stake [29,55,69] for both Candidates and
Committee formations, or the use of Self-interest for the Candidates formation
[66,70,71].
The application of the Security category shows the typical threat model
used by authors. We can observe that the Sybil and the DoS attacks are mostly
mentioned by consensus designed for permissionless blockchains. This is not
surprising since permissioned blockchains control who has access to the network,
mitigating the risk of duplicitous identities. On the other hand, the 51% attack
is in majority mentioned by consensus proposed for Permissioned settings.
5.2 Implications
We believe that this research will be helpful for researchers and practitioners in
that it can facilitate the development of new consensus mechanisms. The paper
highlights the relevant constructs that we consider important when designing
a new consensus. Also, this research can help readers analyze and compare
existing and future consensus.
Organizations wanting to select a consensus algorithm can, as a first step,
consult the flowchart on Figure 4. The flowchart was built on analyzing the
results of the classification framework in Section 4. The process was built “man-
ually” because we wanted to take advantage of the software engineering aspect
of the process. More specifically, when designing any new software application,
one has to take into account the requirements and constraints communicated
by the user, but also be aware of the necessary trade-offs. It is indeed essen-
tial to set priorities when collecting and analyzing requirements. If the process
had been generated automatically, it would have been more difficult to use that
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knowledge. For instance, a decision tree could have been generated but the
underlying algorithm would have used the features without taking into account
this logic behind an organization’s choice.
When an organization wants to choose a suitable consensus for its own appli-
cation, the first element to consider is the Accessibility of the blockchain: does
the organization want a Permissioned or a Permissionless setting?
The process goes on with the salient features regarding the Design, the Per-
formance, and the Security; highlighting our discussion about the prioritization
of requirements: does the organization want to have control on the Leader se-
lection process or the Candidates or Committee Formation (the Design part of
the consensus), or rather on the Performance or even the Security? Depending
on its priority, the organization will follow the chart which will provide some
indication about a suitable consensus for its application. The reader will notice
that the Incentives and Application dimensions are not present in the process.
Indeed, when analyzing the values for both dimensions, one can see that these
factors are not discriminant enough. Furthermore, we feel the presence or ab-
sence of incentives is more of a consequence of the consensus rather than a driver
in selecting it.
This work builds on existing works to enhance and reflect the new advance-
ment of the field. The presentation of the Classification Framework and its
Applications in Sections 3 and 4 show that the results are consistent with past
surveys. Indeed, for a given consensus protocol, we recorded the same values
for the same dimension. This paper differs from existing works because: (i) we
integrated multiple surveys to offer a unified view to the reader, (ii) we added
new dimensions to offer an extended view to the reader, and (iii) we consider the
most recent consensus protocol to offer a current view to the reader. Another
aspect distinguishing this paper from past works is the decision process provided
here, which can help an organization to choose an appropriate protocol given
its requirements and priority.
5.3 Limitations
We need to acknowledge the limitations of this research. First, we purposefully,
did exclude an important aspect related to the blockchain technology, namely
the block structure/content. While this aspect is clearly important, the aim
of this paper was to focus on the consensus part of the blockchain. Hence, we
analyzed the flow applied by the nodes to agree on the state of transactions
instead of focusing on the way transactions are actually stored. Second, we did
not include all of the consensus protocols proposed in the literature, but focused
on the most recent ones. Applying the framework to more articles would have
strengthened the conclusions, yet we believe that the trends and patterns would
not be significantly different.
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Figure 4: Process of Suitable Consensus Selection
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6 Conclusion
Consensus is a mechanism of great importance in blockchain, where the trust in
the system is not ensured by a central authority but instead where it needs to be
programmatically enabled. Consensus protocols have received much attention
by researchers and practitioners, because the seminal protocols (PoW, PoS and
PBFT) present a series of limitations.
From the works reviewed here, we observed that most of the new protocols
provide a contribution regarding the Candidates formation and configuration,
Leader selection and Committee formation and configuration.
We believe that this research will be helpful for researchers and practitioners
in that it can facilitate the development of new consensus mechanisms (by pin-
pointing the relevant constructs), but also it can help readers analyze existing
and future consensus. Finally, an organization looking for guidance on how to
choose a suitable consensus can use the flowchart presented in Section 5.2.
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